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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, ENERGY, 
AND MARKET ENTRY 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.† 
INTRODUCTION 
The stated purpose of this symposium is to explore “the extent to 
which environmental regulations currently act as a barrier to entry in 
energy markets and whether the current regime strikes the right bal-
ance between environmental protection and efficiency.”1 I will discuss 
three contexts in which I believe that existing methods of environ-
mental regulation conflict with energy policy goals: gasoline produc-
tion, importation of liquefied natural gas (“LNG”), and electricity 
transmission. Before I begin to discuss the conflicts I see in each of 
those three areas, however, I need to make explicit the criteria I am 
applying to identify conflicts between environmental regulation and 
energy goals. 
I am using the economist’s concept of allocative efficiency as my 
primary normative criterion for evaluating the effects of environ-
mental regulation on energy policy goals. As Fred Kahn famously 
said: “The central policy prescription of microeconomics is the equa-
tion of price and marginal cost.”2 Many corollaries follow from that 
central principle, e.g., the price of a good or service should include its 
full marginal social cost, including any costs it imposes on the envi-
ronment.3 Thus, for instance, I see no conflict between pursuit of en-
ergy policy goals and environmental regulations that require energy 
market participants to make cost-effective reductions in the costs they 
impose on the environment and to internalize the residual costs they 
impose on the environment. The environmental regulations I identify 
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 1. Letter from Allison H. Ridder, Special Projects Editor, Duke Environmental Law and 
Polciy Forum, to Richard J. Pierce, Jr. (June 17, 2004) (on file with Duke Environmental Law 
and Policy Forum). 
 2. ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 65 (1970). 
 3. Id. at 193-195; RICHARD L. REVESZ & ROBERT N. STAVINS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY, at 4-6 (Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Re-
search Working Paper RWP 04-023, May 2004). 
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as creating conflicts with energy policy are regulations that interfere 
with pursuit of energy goals with little or no resulting environmental 
benefit. These conflicts result from mismatches between regulatory 
powers wielded by different institutions. In particular, state and local 
regulatory agencies often act in ways that conflict with pursuit of na-
tional energy policy goals. 
I.  GASOLINE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 
Gasoline-powered automobile engines cause many billions of 
dollars a year in environmental damage from air pollution.4 Beginning 
in 1970, the U.S. responded to this problem by imposing increasingly 
stringent and increasingly costly air quality rules on both automobile 
manufacturers and suppliers of gasoline.5 Generally, I do not see a 
conflict between those environmental regulations and pursuit of our 
energy policy goals. In fact, I do not think we have gone far enough in 
our efforts to require automobile users to internalize the costs they 
impose on the environment. The residual environmental damage 
caused by the use of gasoline-powered engines in automobiles could 
justify imposition of a substantial additional tax on gasoline.6 I am in-
creasingly concerned, however, about the inefficient and unnecessar-
ily costly manner in which we are regulating gasoline, particularly as it 
interacts with the environmental constraints on expansion of the ca-
pacity of the refineries that produce gasoline. 
Gasoline prices have become increasingly volatile since 2000.7 
Moreover, it is now common for the price of gasoline to vary signifi-
cantly among states and even among localities within the same state.8 
Studies of these phenomena have identified two systemic sources of 
the increased volatility and variability—proliferation of gasoline types 
 
 4. ZYGMUNT PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 744 – 753 (3d ed. 2004). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., ROBERT N. STAVINS & BRADLEY W. WHITEHEAD, THE GREENING OF 
AMERICA'S TAXES: 
POLLUTION CHARGES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Progressive Pol'y Inst. Rept. No. 
13, Oct. 17, 1991). 
 7. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, GASOLINE TYPE PROLIFERATION AND 
PRICE VOLATILITY 4 – 7 (Sep. 2002). 
 8. Id. at 5; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MIDWEST GASOLINE PRICE INVESTIGATION 5 
– 6 (Mar. 29, 2001). 
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and increasingly inadequate domestic refining capacity.9 Both of those 
phenomena, in turn, are rooted in environmental regulation. Unless 
we change some combination of our environmental regulations appli-
cable to refineries and/or our environmental regulations applicable to 
gasoline, we can expect the U.S. gasoline market to perform in an in-
creasingly unacceptable manner. 
Until 1990, there were three types of gasoline sold in the U.S.—
regular, midgrade, and premium.10 The gasoline market was intensely 
competitive and performed well. Each type of gasoline was produced 
in many refineries owned by many different firms. In addition, each 
type of gasoline was readily available from numerous foreign refiner-
ies. Local or regional shortages or price spikes were rare and short 
lived. If a refinery serving an area shut down unexpectedly or the 
level of gasoline consumption in an area was unusually high, supplies 
from other refineries quickly moved into the area to eliminate any 
temporary imbalance between supply and demand. No refiner could 
exercise market power unilaterally, and the large number of refiners 
made collusion virtually impossible. 
Environmental regulations on gasoline imposed by states are 
changing the basic characteristics of the gasoline market in ways that 
have already increased price volatility and regional variability, and 
that have the potential to increase significantly the risk of both uni-
lateral and collusive exercises of market power by refiners. As of 
2002, there were twenty-one types of gasoline sold in the United 
States, eighteen of which were mandated by states for use in some lo-
calities.11 This has already changed the characteristics of the gasoline 
market in unfortunate ways. Many types of gasoline are now pro-
duced by only one or a few refineries.12 Many of the gasoline types 
can be produced only if a refinery makes a large capital investment, 
the value of which is limited to the production of that type of gaso-
line.13 Only a few refineries are willing to make the investment re-
quired to produce many of the new types of gasoline.14 No refinery 
 
 9. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 13-22; ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 7, at 4; Statement of John Cook, Director Petroleum Division, 
Energy Information Administration, Before the Subcommittee on Energy and 
Air Quality, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives 3 – 5 (March 
30, 2001). 
 10. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 7, at 2. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. at 5 – 6. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. Id. at 6. 
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can produce economically anywhere near all twenty one types of 
gasoline that are now mandated for use in the U.S. The proliferation 
of gasoline types also has disrupted the efficient functioning of the 
gasoline distribution system.15 Each gasoline type must by separately 
batch-fed through product pipelines to avoid commingling. 
The Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) has summa-
rized the results of our increasingly fragmented gasoline market.16 
With refineries typically operating at or near capacity, a supply-
demand imbalance can occur at any time for a variety of reasons—an 
unexpected refinery or pipeline shutdown or an unexpected increase 
in demand. When this happens in one of the localities or regions that 
uses one of the many unique gasoline types, the locality or region 
cannot obtain supplies from neighboring areas or from other refiner-
ies because the neighboring areas use different types of gasoline and 
other refineries lack the capability to produce the type of gasoline 
that is in short supply.17 In most cases, the area that experiences the 
shortage also cannot turn to imports because few foreign refineries 
are willing to make the capitol investment necessary to produce any 
of the many unique types of gasoline mandated for use in various 
parts of the U.S.18 
There are indications that the balkanization of the U.S. gasoline 
market is also beginning to have adverse effects on the competitive-
ness of the market. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has 
conducted numerous investigations of the U.S. gasoline market and 
has a program through which it systematically monitors the perform-
ance of that market.19 Until recently, FTC had never found any evi-
dence of collusion or of unilateral exercises of market power by any 
participant in that market. Those results are not surprising, since the 
structural characteristics of the market—a large number of firms 
competing in a national market—rendered either collusion or unilat-
eral exercise of market power virtually impossible. 
 
 15. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, GASOLINE TYPE PROLIFERATION AND 
PRICE VOLATILITY 2-4 (Sep. 2002). 
 16. Id. at 14 – 15. 
 17. Id. at 4 – 6. 
 18. Id. at 5; John Cook, supra note 9, at 3 – 5. 
 19. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Market Forces, Anticompeti-
tive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect Competitive Markets, Presented 
by William E. Kovacic, General Counsel, Before the Subcommittee of Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, United States House of 
Representatives (July 7, 2004). 
PIERCE_FMT.DOC 11/14/2005  4:41 PM 
Spring 2005] ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ENERGY MARKETS 171 
In the last five years, however, FTC has found evidence of uni-
lateral exercises of market power in two cases. In the first case, FTC 
took no action because unilateral withholding of capacity to increase 
prices does not violate antitrust law or any other federal statute.20 In 
the second case, FTC filed a complaint in which it alleged that the 
firm “used false and misleading statements to induce a government 
body [the California Air Resources Board] to issue regulatory stan-
dards that conferred market power upon the firm.”21 An FTC Admin-
istrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) dismissed the complaint on the basis of 
his conclusion that the firm’s conduct was insulated from antitrust li-
ability because it fell within the scope of the petitioning government 
defense.22 FTC reversed and vacated that ALJ decision and has re-
manded the case for further proceedings before the ALJ.23 
It should not come as a surprise that EIA and FTC have begun 
to detect problems in the performance of the gasoline market. State 
environmental regulations have transformed the gasoline market 
from a single national market with a large number of sellers to eight-
een smaller markets, each with a small number of sellers.24 When the 
new characteristics of the balkanized gasoline market are combined 
with the low price elasticity of demand for gasoline and refineries that 
almost always operate at full capacity,25 we now have a plethora of 
distinct local and regional markets each of which is increasingly sus-
ceptible to either collusive or unilateral exercises of market power. 
Unless we change our methods of regulating gasoline, these 
problems are likely to become much worse in the near future. EIA 
predicts that recent changes in air quality regulations will increase 
significantly the number of different types of gasoline that are sold in 
the U.S.26 Thus, for instance, EIA predicts that eight new types of 
gasoline will be mandated on the East Coast alone over the next few 
years. As the balkanization of the gasoline market continues, and the 
 
 20. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 21. 
 21. Opinion of the Commission, In the Matter of Union Oil Co. of California, File No. 011 
0214, Docket No. 9305, at 1 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July 7, 2004). 
 22. Initial Decision, In the Matter of Union Oil Co. of California, File No. 011 0214, 
Docket No. 9305 (Fed. Trade Comm'n, Nov. 25 2003). 
 23. Order Reversing and Vacating the Initial Decision and Order and Remanding for Fur-
ther 
Proceedings, In the Matter of Union Oil Co. of California, File No. 011 0214, Docket No. 9305 
(Federal Trade Comm'n July 6, 2004). 
 24. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 7. 
 25. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 7 – 8. 
 26. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 7, at 7 – 11. 
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number of types of gasoline increases to forty or fifty, the number of 
refining firms that participate in each market will continue to de-
crease and the risk of both collusive and unilateral exercises of mar-
ket power will soar. 
The primary sources of the growing problems in the gasoline 
market are easy to identify—environmental regulations that make it 
impossible to construct new refineries in the U.S. and environmental 
regulations that have increased dramatically the number of types of 
gasoline sold in the U.S. All refineries in the U.S. have been operat-
ing at or near maximum capacity in recent years. Both EIA and FTC 
have repeatedly warned that we can expect to experience increasing 
problems in the performance of the markets for gasoline and other 
refined petroleum products unless we increase our refining capacity 
substantially.27 Yet, almost 50 refineries have closed in the last dec-
ade, and no new refinery has been built in the U.S. in twenty-five 
years.28 The capacity of some existing refineries has been increased 
but not at the rate required to keep pace with the growth in demand 
for petroleum products.29 
The primary impediments to construction of new refineries and 
capacity expansion of existing refineries are state and local land use 
regulations.30 The environmental regulatory obstacles to construction 
of new refineries or expansion of existing refineries are so formidable, 
and the local opposition to any such proposal is so determined, that it 
is hard to be optimistic about the prospect for overcoming those ob-
stacles. To have any chance of success, any such strategy would have 
to include some means through which a federal agency, e.g., the De-
partment of Energy (“DOE”), could pre-empt the power of state and 
local agencies to block or delay interminably the construction or ex-
pansion of a refinery, if DOE determines that the new or expanded 
capacity refinery is needed to meet the demand for petroleum prod-
ucts. 
 
 27. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 8, at p. 22; John Cook, supra note 9, at 3; 
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 19, at 26 – 27. 
 28. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 7- 
14 (May 2001). 
 29. Id. at 7-13. 
 30. Federal courts sometimes contribute to the problem as well. Thus, for instance, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the Corps of Engineers could not issue a permit authorizing a refinery 
capacity expansion first proposed in 1969 without engaging in further study of the environ-
mental effects of the expansion. Ocean Advocates v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 361 F. 3d 1108, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2004), amended and superceded by Nos. 01-36133, 01-36144, 2005 WL 525269 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
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The proliferation of gasoline types is primarily attributable to the 
form of federalism we have adopted in implementing the Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”).31 EPA determines the maximum permissible concen-
tration of various pollutants in the ambient air, and states then decide 
on a combination of regulatory actions to reduce emissions to the ex-
tent necessary to comply with the EPA ambient air standards.32 As 
EPA increases the stringency of the ambient air standards, an increas-
ing number of localities are out of compliance by an increasing 
amount, and states must devise new means of attempting to reduce 
emissions in the non-attainment areas within each state. Each state 
responds by imposing different regulations on the composition of the 
gasoline that can be sold in each of several non-attainment areas 
within the state. That is the basic mechanism which produced an in-
crease in gasoline types from three to twenty-one between 1990 and 
2002, and that FTC and EIA predict will create a U.S. gasoline mar-
ket with forty to fifty gasoline types within the next few years.33 If this 
gasoline type proliferation is allowed to continue, along with the per-
sistent and growing shortage of refining capacity, increased problems 
with the performance of U.S. gasoline markets are inevitable. 
It is easy to identify a means of reducing the number of types of 
gasoline mandated for sale in the United States. Congress can amend 
the CAA by limiting the discretion of states to mandate particular 
types of gasoline. Congress took an analogous step in 1977 when it 
detected the risk that states would respond to EPA ambient air rules 
by mandating changes in automobile standards, which would result in 
a proliferation of types of cars. Congress recognized that a state-
mandated proliferation of car types would cause significant problems 
in the performance of the automobile market. It avoided those prob-
lems by amending the CAA by adding provisions that limit each 
state’s power to mandate a particular car type. A state can mandate 
the sale of “California cars” or “non-California cars”, but no state can 
require the production and sale of a third type of car.34 Congress 
could impose the same type of restriction on states’ discretion to 
mandate particular gasoline-types, e.g., a state can require a non-
 
 31. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401a – 7401c (2000). 
 32. See Whitman v. Am.Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462-64 (2001) (discussing this regu-
latory scheme). 
 33. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 7. 
 34. See Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Massachusetts Dep't.of Envtl. Prot.,163 F. 3d 74, 77 – 78 
(1st Cir. 1998) (discussing the operation and effect of these provisions). 
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attainment area to use a “Los Angeles gasoline” or a “Detroit gaso-
line”, but it cannot mandate sale of a third type of gasoline. 
It is not clear whether such a federal restriction on states’ discre-
tion to mandate gasoline types would reduce the average price of 
gasoline in the U.S. Generally, state gasoline type mandates have 
been designed to achieve the federally-mandated ambient air quality 
at the lowest cost to local gasoline consumers. Thus, for instance, if 
air quality goals can be achieved by mandating either a highly clean-
burning gasoline that costs five cents more per gallon to produce or a 
moderately clean-burning gasoline that costs three cents more per 
gallon, a state typically mandates sale of the dirtier but cheaper gaso-
line type. States would be precluded from making that type of choice 
under the amendment to CAA I propose. I do not know whether the 
resulting increase in production cost would be less or more than the 
savings attributable to a more efficient distribution system and a mar-
ket structure that once again renders it impossible for sellers to exer-
cise market power. Even if the net effect of such an amendment to 
CAA is to increase the average price of gasoline, however, I would 
still consider it a major improvement over the status quo. Any price 
increases caused by continuing proliferation of gasoline types are a 
deadweight loss to society. Conversely, increases in production costs 
and prices attributable to increased use of cleaner-burning gasoline 
are likely to be more than offset by the social benefits of cleaner air. 
II.  LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel. It accounts for 
twenty-three percent of the energy consumed in the U.S.35 Its propor-
tionate contribution to U.S. energy consumption has increased stead-
ily and is expected to continue to increase for the foreseeable future, 
primarily because of its relatively benign effects on the environment.36 
Eighty-five percent of the gas consumed in the U.S. is produced do-
mestically and another fourteen percent is imported from Canada.37 
Only one percent is imported from other countries in the form of liq-
uefied natural gas.38 
 
 35. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 9 (2004) 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 9, 91; NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, supra note 28, at 1 – 
7. 
 38. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, THE GLOBAL LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 
MARKET: STATUS AND OUTLOOK 29 (Dec. 2003). 
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The amount of LNG the U.S. imports must increase substantially 
over the next ten years to avoid a large and growing gas shortage.39 
Deliverability from Canadian reserves has leveled off and is begin-
ning to decline, while demand for gas in Canada is continuing to in-
crease.40 As a result, imports from Canada are projected to decline 
gradually over the next decade.41 Deliverability from U.S. reserves 
that have already been developed is also declining.42 The federal gov-
ernment has imposed a moratorium on exploration and development 
on lands that contain almost half of the remaining undeveloped re-
serves in the country.43 Supply from new sources that have not been 
placed off limits by Congress or the President cannot possibly keep 
pace with the expected increases in demand. As a result, the U.S. 
must increase its imports of LNG by approximately five trillion cubic 
feet per year to avoid a large and growing shortage.44 If the required 
increase does not occur in a timely manner, the price of gas will in-
crease substantially, with severe adverse effects on both the perform-
ance of the economy and on air quality, as consumers switch to dirtier 
and less desirable fuels. 
There are many reasons for optimism with respect to our ability 
to avoid a gas shortage by increasing our LNG imports. There are 
large gas reserves in many locations around the world that are not ac-
cessible to markets by pipeline.45 With large stranded gas reserves lo-
cated in many countries, the global LNG market will remain intensely 
competitive, and the U.S. should be able to contract to purchase 
enough LNG to meet our needs at reasonable prices.46 Because of 
technological improvements, the cost of liquefying, transporting, and 
regasifying LNG has declined to the point at which imported LNG is 
not likely to cost much more than domestically produced gas.47 
At the federal level, the legal regime is also a source of optimism. 
In 2002, Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
in which it gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) authority to approve the construction of onshore LNG 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at 91. 
 41. Id. at 91, fig.89. 
 42. Id. at 90, fig.87. 
 43. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, supra note 28, at 5-7 to 5-10. 
 44. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 35, at 91. 
 45. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 38, at 4 – 16. 
 46. Id. at 32 – 41. 
 47. Id. at 42 – 46. 
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terminals and the Coast Guard authority to approve offshore termi-
nals.48 Each of those lead agencies has established an efficient but 
thorough multi-agency process for evaluating the environmental, 
safety, and operational effects of each proposed terminal.49 Over 
twenty applications to construct LNG terminals have been filed since 
2002.50 The Coast Guard has already approved two applications for 
offshore terminals, while FERC has already approved one application 
for an onshore terminal.51 There is only one potential problem. Pow-
erful NIMBY-based local opposition to each of the proposed termi-
nals has emerged, and a variety of state and local agencies have 
claimed to have legal authority to block construction of each of the 
terminals.52 The courts have not yet decided whether state and local 
regulatory agencies can block construction of LNG terminals that 
have been approved by FERC or the Coast Guard. If the courts con-
clude that state or local agencies do have that power, the local opposi-
tion to LNG terminals is so powerful that the U.S. will be unable to 
construct enough terminals to avoid a catastrophic gas shortage. In 
such a case, the resulting conflict between state and local environ-
mental regulation and national energy policy could only be elimi-
nated by enactment of a statute that gives federal agencies or federal 
courts authority to override the decisions of state or local agencies 
when those decisions interfere with the nation’s ability to obtain 
enough natural gas to meet our needs.53 
III.  ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION 
By far the most important conflict between environmental regu-
lation and energy policy at present is in the context of electricity 
transmission capacity. The U.S. has a large and growing shortage of 
 
 48. Pub. L. No. 107-295 § 106, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 
 49. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. LNG MARKETS AND USES: JUNE 2004 
UPDATE 9. 
 50. Id. at 1. 
 51. Id. at 7. 
 52. See, e.g., Christian Schmollinger, CPUC to Appeal FERC Denial of Say Over LNG 
Terminal Siting, NATURAL GAS WEEK, July 12, 2004, at 3; Barbara Shook, Texas Asserts Rights 
on LNG Siting, NATURAL GAS WEEK, June 21, 2004, at 6; Jeff Gosmano, Local Foes Biggest 
LNG Hurdle, NATURAL GAS WEEK, June 4, 2004, at 5; John Sullivan, Politics, Not Safety Main 
Risks to Future of LNG Industry, NATURAL GAS WEEK, May 21, 2004, at 20; Barbara Shook, 
Maine Rejects TransCanada LNG Terminal Plans a Second Time, NATURAL GAS WEEK, May 
14, 2004, at 1. 
 53. A bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives to give federal agencies 
preemptive power to authorize LNG terminals, but states oppose it. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm'n, Mem. Opposing Enactment of H.R. 4413 (July 2, 2004). 
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electricity transmission capacity.54 Eric Hirst has summarized nicely 
the importance of adequate transmission capacity to the performance 
of the U.S. electricity market: 
Transmission generally enhances reliability; lowers the cost of elec-
tricity delivered to consumers; limits the ability of generators to ex-
ercise market power; and provides flexibility to protect against un-
certainties about future fuel prices, load growth, generator 
construction, and other factors affecting the electric system.55 
Over the last twenty years, transmission capacity per megawatt of 
electricity generated has declined by thirty per cent, and it is expected 
to decline by another eleven per cent over the next decade.56 Capacity 
declined by fourteen to twenty-seven per cent in each of the ten elec-
tricity regions during the last thirteen years.57 The large and growing 
shortage of transmission capacity is already having severe adverse ef-
fects. Inadequate transmission capacity was one of the major causes 
of each of the price spikes and blackouts the U.S. has experienced in 
recent years, including the ten-fold increase in the price of electricity 
in California in 200158 and the northeast power blackout in 2003.59 The 
increasingly inadequate capacity of the transmission grid has forced 
the National Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”) to increase the 
number of curtailments of electric service it has ordered by six hun-
dred per cent over the last five years.60 It now orders electricity cur-
tailments almost two thousand times per year in the eastern United 
States alone.61 In addition, the regional bodies that operate the power 
grid estimate that transmission congestion now costs consumers $4.8 
billion per year—in the form of payments for high cost electricity 
when lower cost electricity would be available but for a transmission 
bottleneck.62 
 
 54. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 5 – 7 (2002). 
 55. ERIC HIRST, U.S. TRANSMISSION CAPACITY: PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS v (August 2004). 
 56. Id. at 7, 9. 
 57. Id. at 11, fig.6. 
 58. Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, Aftershocks—And Essential Lessons—From the 
California Electricity Debacle, 16 THE ELECTRICITY J. 24, 26 (No. 4, May 2003); ERIC HIRST, 
THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES 6 (July 2001); Robert R. 
Nordhaus, Electric Power Deregulation: Making Partially Deregulated Markets Work, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 365, 372 (2002). 
 59. EDWARD N. KRAPELS, GOODBYE GRIDLOCK (2): HOW TO END THE SHORTAGE IN 
TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT THAT LED TO THE NORTHEAST BLACKOUT (2003). 
 60. HIRST, supra note 55, at 7 – 8. 
 61. Id. at 8. 
 62. Id. 
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Ashley Brown has identified the primary source of this problem: 
benefits are regional, but costs are local.63 Even though a transmission 
expansion project invariably confers large benefits in many states, the 
state in which the proposed project would be implemented has the 
power to block the project.64 To make matters worse, twenty-two 
states allow localities to block transmission expansion projects.65 Most 
proposed transmission expansion projects elicit powerful NIMBY-
based local opposition.66 Project opponents use state and local regula-
tory bodies to block implementation of most proposed projects. This 
problem has become so severe in many parts of the country that peo-
ple have become unwilling to even propose a transmission expansion 
project.67 
The problem is particularly severe in the major metropolitan ar-
eas in which most of the U.S. population lives. Edward Krapels pro-
vides a nice description of this aspect of the problem in his study of 
the 2003 northeast power blackout: 
In 90 percent of . . . the United States, it is challenging, but possible, 
to establish a mix of generation and transmission assets that consti-
tute an efficient power infrastructure. In the other 10 percent, it is 
extremely difficult to do so, and over time these areas have evolved 
into ‘load pockets.’ These are typically densely populated areas 
where generation facilities were built decades ago, are difficult to 
refurbish (and thus highly polluting) and where transmission grids 
are similarly dated and compressed. 
The majority of the people in this country live in that 10 percent of 
the landscape. Thus, the central interest in transmission policy 
should be—but seldom is—in the 10 percent of the landscape that 
contains the load pockets of the power markets. The load pockets 
include most of the major American cities, and so to a significant 
degree transmission policy should focus on how to bring power to 
the people who live in urban areas.68 
Over the last decade, FERC has created a competitive wholesale 
market that provides many consumers with the benefits of access to a 
 
 63. Ashley C. Brown, Vision Without Site: Site Without Vision, 16 THE ELECTRICITY J. 23, 
23 – 34 (No.8, Oct. 2003). 
 64. Id. at 24. 
 65. ASHLEY C. BROWN, TRANSMISSION AND GENERATION SITING AND EXERCISE OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS: BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVE, AND THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL 
ROLE 3, 13 (2002). 
 66. As Edward Krapels aptly describes the situation: "Transmission projects are as popular 
as root canals." KRAPELS, supra note 59, at 19. 
 67. Eric Hirst, Transmission Investment: All Talk and Little Action, PUBLIC UTILITIES 
FORTNIGHTLY 49 – 54 (July 2004). 
 68. Id. at 7 – 8. 
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competitive market.69 The millions of consumers that live in load 
pockets cannot obtain access to those benefits, however, during the 
frequent periods in which transmission constraints preclude genera-
tors outside the load pocket from selling to consumers inside the load 
pocket.70 During those increasingly frequent periods of time, consum-
ers within a load pocket are at the mercy of the few firms that own 
generators within the load pocket. 
Our inability to reduce or eliminate the transmission bottlenecks 
that create load pockets also has severe adverse effects on the envi-
ronment. The demographic and atmospheric conditions in most load 
pockets make them the worst possible places to generate electricity. If 
there were enough transmission capacity into a major metropolitan 
area, we could simultaneously reduce the cost of electricity to con-
sumers in the area and improve the air quality of the area by replac-
ing the electricity generated by the high polluting, technologically and 
economically obsolete generating units in a load pocket with electric-
ity generated by modern low polluting generating units located in low 
population density areas.71 Instead, we are forced to operate the old 
dirty generating plants within the load pocket at maximum capacity 
and even to construct new generating plants in high population den-
sity locations that are poorly-suited to them.72 
Ashley Brown has collected a large number of cases from many 
states to illustrate the extreme difficulty of obtaining regulatory ap-
proval of a proposed transmission expansion project.73 I will describe 
two that illustrate the nature of the problem particularly well. The 
first case illustrates the decisional framework that a state agency will 
use in deciding whether to approve a transmission expansion project. 
The Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Board approved a pro-
posed project on the basis that the project was required to meet re-
gional needs.74 In Point of Pines Beach Association v. Energy Facilities 
 
 69. FERC's liberalization of the wholesale electricity market has reduced the average 
wholesale price of electricity by approximately thirty-six per cent. ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY 
ASSOCIATION, ASSESSING THE 
"GOOD OLD DAYS" OF COST-PLUS REGULATION 5 (2001); see also PAUL JOSKOW, THE 
DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN THE U.S. (2003). 
 70. KRAPELS, supra note 59, at 25. 
 71. Id. at 7 – 8. 
 72. Id. at 25 – 26. 
 73. Brown, supra note 63, at 26 – 34. 
 74. Point of Pines Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 644 N.E. 2d 221, 222 
(Mass. 1995). 
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Siting Board,75 however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
reversed the Board on the basis that it had erroneously considered 
out-of-state benefits in deciding to approve the project. The court 
held that a state agency can only consider in-state benefits when it de-
cides whether to approve a project.76 Many other states have man-
dated parochialism in this context.77 Of course, even when a state 
agency is free to consider the out-of-state benefits of a project, politi-
cal incentives favor considering only the in-state benefits of a pro-
posed project. 
State parochialism has a devastating effect on the prospects of 
approval of most proposed transmission capacity expansion projects. 
Except for projects proposed in Alaska, Hawaii, or parts of Texas, all 
transmission expansion projects have beneficial effects in many 
states.78 Yet, state agencies consider only in-state benefits when they 
decide whether to approve a project. Thus, for instance, if a proposed 
project has beneficial effects evenly distributed over ten states, the 
state with the power to veto the project can be expected to exercise 
that veto power even if the benefits of the proposed project are nine 
times greater than its costs.79 Of course, the situation is even worse in 
the twenty-two states that allow localities to veto proposed projects. If 
one per cent of the benefits of a proposed project fall within a locality 
with veto power, that locality can be expected to veto the project even 
if its benefits are ninety-nine times greater than its costs. 
The second case illustrates well the difficulty of attempting to re-
duce transmission constraints into load pockets. The New York met-
ropolitan area, including Long Island, is a classic load pocket that is 
subject to severe and growing transmission constraints.80 In 2001, the 
Cross-Sound Cable Company proposed to expand the transmission 
 
 75. Id. at 224. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Brown, supra note 63, at 26 – 34 (listing cases discussing mandated parochialism). 
 78. Electricity flows across an integrated grid in inverse proportion to the impedance on 
each line in accordance with Kirchoff's law. Thus, since the continental United States consists of 
three integrated grids—one that covers part of Texas, one that covers the rest of the country 
east of the rockies, and one that covers the part of the country that is west of the Rockies—any 
change in transmission capacity at any location in the east effects the availability of electricity 
throughout the east and any change in transmission capacity at any location in the west affects 
the availability of electricity throughout the west. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, TRANSMISSION POLICY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Policy, Related Publica-
tion 04-26, October 2004). 
 79. Id. Any rational state will refuse to approve a project with in-state costs that exceed its 
in-state benefits. 
 80. HIRST, supra note 55, at 20 – 21. See also KRAPELS, supra note 59, at 23 – 24. 
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capacity into that load pocket by burying a 330 megawatt cable under 
Long Island Sound from Connecticut to Long Island.81 The project 
was strongly supported by the federal government, the State of New 
York, and the regional entities responsible for the transmission grids 
serving New England and New York.82 The Corps of Engineers and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service approved the project on the 
basis of their conclusions that it would not have adverse effects on 
fisheries resources or on navigation.83 
The Connecticut Siting Council initially refused to approve the 
project because its benefits would accrue primarily to New York resi-
dents.84 On reconsideration, however, the Council approved the pro-
ject on the basis of its conclusions that “the proposed project would 
enhance the inter-regional electric transmission infrastructure and 
improve the reliability and efficiencies of the electrical system here in 
Connecticut as well as in New York,” and that “preparedness and co-
operation are in the best interests of the State, the region, and the na-
tion.”85 Cross-Sound soon found out, however, that other institutions 
in Connecticut do not share the spirit of regional cooperation and pa-
triotism reflected in the decision of the Siting Council. 
When Cross-Sound installed the cable in 2002, it discovered that 
the cable laying ship it hired for that purpose was incapable of bury-
ing approximately one percent of the cable to the depth specified in 
its permit.86 Cross-Sound applied to the Corps of Engineers and to the 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (“CDEP”) for 
a waiver that would permit it to operate the cable with a small portion 
buried to a depth less than that specified in its permit.87 Both CDEP 
and the Corps concluded that such a waiver would not have adverse 
environmental effects, but CDEP notified Cross-Sound that it could 
not operate the cable on “procedural” grounds without burying one 
hundred per cent of the cable to the depth specified in its permit.88 
CDEP also notified Cross-Sound that CDEP could not consider 
 
 81. Linda L. Randell & Bruce L. McDermott, Chronicles of a Transmission Line Siting, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 1 – 2 (Jan. 1, 2003). 
 82. Alan G. Schwartz & Bruce L. McDermott, Lessons from the Trenches: Burying the 
Lines Is Tough, INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (Spring 2002). 
 83. Linda Randell & Bruce McDermott, Cross-Sound Blues, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 20 (Feb. 
2004). 
 84. Brown, supra note 63, at 29. 
 85. Schwartz & McDermott, supra note 82, at 2; Brown, supra note 63, at 28 – 29. 
 86. Schwartz & McDermott, supra note 82, at 3. 
 87. Randell & McDermott, supra note 83, at 22. 
 88. Id. at 20. 
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Cross-Sound’s application for a waiver or its application to take any 
other action that would allow it to operate the cable because the 
Connecticut Legislature had enacted a moratorium on transmission 
lines under Long Island Sound.89 
Because of the Connecticut moratorium, Cross-Sound was un-
able to operate its transmission line until August 2003.90 Then, in the 
wake of the northeast power blackout, the Department of Energy is-
sued an emergency order that required Cross-Sound to transmit elec-
tricity to New York.91 In May 2004, DOE determined that the emer-
gency was over and cancelled the emergency order.92 Cross-Sound 
then shut down the cable, but it also asked FERC to authorize it to 
reactivate the cable.93 FERC convened a settlement conference. On 
June 24, Cross-Sound, New York, and Connecticut, represented by its 
Department of Public Utility Control, agreed on a settlement that 
would allow the cable to be reactivated.94 On the same day, however, 
the Connecticut Attorney General announced that he had not agreed 
to the settlement and that he was considering opposing it.95 Thus, the 
Cross-Sound transmission cable remains in a state of legal limbo. 
In the meantime, the fate of the Cross-Sound project has sent a 
clear message to anyone else who was considering whether to propose 
a transmission expansion project to reduce the transmission bottle-
necks into the New York Metropolitan area. That message is: don’t 
even think about it. Given the powerful opposition to all above-
ground transmission lines, underwater lines were viewed as the only 
hope to reduce the extreme level of transmission congestion into the 
New York metropolitan area.96 If a project sponsor cannot even con-
vince state authorities to allow it to operate a critically-needed un-
derwater transmission line in circumstances in which every agency has 
determined that activation of the line will have no adverse effect on 
 
 89. Id. at 20 – 22. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Department of Energy Order No. 202-03-4 (May 7, 2004). 
 93. FERC News Release, Statement of FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III on Long Island 
Sound Electric Cable Settlement (June 24, 2004) available at http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/pr-
archives/2004/2004-2/06-24-04.pdf (last visited Apr. 15th, 2005). 
 94. Id. See also David Udoff, NY, Conn. Reach Settlement to Re-Activate Cross-Sound Ca-
ble, NATURAL GAS WEEK, June 28, 2004, at 1 – 3. 
 95. Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Press Release, Attorney General's Statement 
on FERC Decision on Cross-Sound Cable (June 24, 2004). 
 96. KRAPELS, supra note 59, at p. 19. 
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the environment, other transmission expansion projects have no real-
istic chance of being approved. 
The conflict between state and local environmental regulation of 
transmission lines and pursuit of national energy goals is already cost-
ing consumers many billions of dollars per year. If this conflict is not 
resolved in the near future, it will produce even higher electricity 
costs and frequent blackouts. The conflict can be eliminated by con-
ferring on a federal agency or on the federal courts authority to over-
ride the decisions of state and local governments when those deci-
sions interfere with pursuit of national energy policy goals. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the three conflicts I have identified between environ-
mental regulations and national energy policy involve state environ-
mental regulation. I have not identified any clear conflicts between 
federal environmental regulations and national energy policy. That is 
primarily because I have chosen to define a conflict between envi-
ronmental regulations and national energy policy as an environmental 
regulation that reduces energy supplies or increases energy costs 
without any significant offsetting environmental benefit. If I had cho-
sen to define such conflicts to include all environmental regulations 
that reduce energy supplies or increase the cost of energy, I would 
have identified countless thousands of conflicts between federal envi-
ronmental regulations and national energy policy. I reject that broad 
definition of a conflict, however, because it is inconsistent with my 
use of allocative efficiency as my normative basis for identifying a 
conflict. 
It should come as no surprise that I have not identified any clear 
conflict between federal environmental regulations and national en-
ergy policy through application of my criterion for identifying a con-
flict. Any time a federal agency is required to decide whether to ap-
prove proposed projects that will create some energy benefits at some 
environmental cost, it strives to approve only projects with benefits 
that exceed their costs. Similarly, any time a federal agency is re-
quired to decide whether to impose regulations that will create envi-
ronmental benefits at some energy cost, it strives to issue only those 
regulations with benefits that exceed their costs. Federal agencies un-
doubtedly err on occasion in making those decisions, but my inability 
to identify those errors reflects the difficulty of the task of second-
guessing agencies that are required to make judgment calls in a com-
plicated environment that is fraught with uncertainty. 
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Conversely, it should come as no surprise that I have been able 
to identify three contexts in which state and local environmental regu-
lations conflict in serious ways with pursuit of national energy policy. 
Systemic conflicts between state regulation and the national interest 
are inevitable. When a state decides to issue an environmental regula-
tion, it considers only the in-state costs and benefits of the regulation. 
Thus, for instance, a state might decide to mandate three new idio-
syncratic types of gasoline for use in each of three non-attainment ar-
eas in an effort to minimize the additional cost of gasoline in each of 
those areas even though the effect of that decision, combined with 
similar decisions by other states, is to create so many different types 
of gasoline that the national gasoline sales and distribution markets 
perform poorly. 
Similarly, when a state decides whether to approve a project, it 
considers only the in-state costs and benefits of the project. Thus, for 
instance, a state will veto a proposed LNG terminal or transmission 
expansion project that will create benefits nine times as great as its 
costs if all of the costs are incurred within the state and only ten per 
cent of the benefits accrue to state residents. 
Serious systemic conflicts of this type can be avoided only by 
creating a better match between the geographic scope of regulatory 
actions and the institutions with the power to take those actions. In 
each of the contexts I have discussed, we can eliminate the conflict 
only by reducing the power of state and local regulators and/or by 
transferring some regulatory authority from state and local agencies 
to federal agencies. In each case, it would be easy to draft a statute 
that would avoid the conflict because Congress has already enacted 
statutes that eliminate similar conflicts. 
The conflict created by state gasoline-type mandates can be 
eliminated by adding to the Clean Air Act a provision analogous to 
the “no third car” provision. In 1977, Congress recognized the risk 
that states might inadvertently create chaos in the car market by 
mandating the sale of many different types of cars with different pol-
lution control technologies. Congress avoided that risk by limiting 
states’ choices of car types. A state can mandate sale of “California 
cars” or “non-California cars,” but it cannot mandate sale of a third 
type of car.97 Congress could, and should, head off the problems that 
 
 97. For a good description of the "no third car" rule, see American Automobile Manufac-
turers Ass'n v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, 163 F. 3d 74 (1st Cir. 
1998). 
PIERCE_FMT.DOC 11/14/2005  4:41 PM 
Spring 2005] ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ENERGY MARKETS 185 
are emerging in the performance of the gasoline market by imposing 
an analogous limit on each states’ discretion to mandate gasoline 
types, e.g., a state can mandate sale of “Los Angeles gasoline” or 
“Detroit gasoline,” but it cannot mandate sale of a third type of gaso-
line. 
The other sources of the conflicts I have identified are state and 
local land use decisions that conflict with national energy policy. 
States and localities are making land use decisions that make it im-
possible to construct the refineries, LNG terminals, and transmission 
lines that are essential to the nation’s ability to obtain adequate en-
ergy supplies at acceptable costs. Existing federal statutes provide two 
models that Congress can use as the basis for statutes that eliminate 
these conflicts. The first is section 7 of the Natural Gas Act. That 
statutory provision authorizes FERC to make preemptive decisions to 
authorize construction of interstate pipelines.98 Congress can enact 
statutes analogous to section 7 of the Natural Gas Act in which it con-
fers power on a federal agency to make pre-emptive decisions to au-
thorize construction of refineries, LNG terminals, and transmission 
lines. Alternatively, if Congress wants to leave states and localities 
some degree of discretion over land use decisions of this type, it could 
enact statutes analogous to the Telecommunications Reform Act of 
1996.99 That statute allows state and local agencies to make land use 
decisions that have potential effects on attainment of national tele-
communications policy goals, e.g., decisions to grant or deny permits 
to construct cellular phone towers. The statute then instructs federal 
courts to review those state and local decisions and to reject those 
that are inconsistent with attainment of national telecommunications 
policy goals.100 Congress could enact analogous statutes that instruct 
federal courts to review state and local land use decisions that have 
potential effects on attainment of national energy policy goals and to 
reject those that interfere with attainment of those goals. 
There is one major problem with my proposed means of elimi-
nating these conflicts. It assumes that Congress is willing and able to 
enact socially-beneficial energy legislation. That is not at all clear. 
The energy legislation proposed by the Bush Administration in 2001 
and the Bills subsequently enacted by the House and Senate included 
 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2000). 
 99. Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 5b (1996). 
 100. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2005 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 18.7 
(2004). 
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some provisions of the type I support.101 In each case, however, those 
few socially-beneficial provisions were buried in a mass of other pro-
visions with highly dubious effects and mixed with an extraordinary 
amount of pure pork. The effort to enact a sensible energy statute is 
being held hostage by members of Congress who are debating issues 
like how many additional billions of dollars Archer Daniels Midland 
should receive in ethanol subsidies and whether plaintiff’s lawyers 
should be allowed to earn billions of dollars in contingent fees by su-
ing the manufacturers of the gasoline additive MTBE.102 Unless and 
until Congress becomes serious about enacting a relatively pork-free 
energy statute, the conflicts I describe will continue and will render it 
impossible to have efficiently functioning energy markets. 
 
 101. Thus, for instance, both President Bush's proposed legislation and each of the Bills that 
has been enacted by the House or Senate to date include provisions that would increase the au-
thority of the federal government to authorize implementation of electricity transmission ex-
pansion projects. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY 
POLICY 7-17 (May 2001); Michael Burr, A study in States' Rights, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 21 (Feb. 
2004). 
 102. See House Again Passes GOP Energy Measure, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 
2004, at A4; Energy Follies, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 29, 2004, at A24; Energy Voodoo, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, 
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